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1. Introduction 
In a recent article in this journal, David N. Laband (1983) examines Presi- 
dent Reagan's success at decreasing the size and scope of the federal Levia- 
thon. Based on proposed cuts in Federal budgets and employment, the argu- 
ment is made that, in an environment of falling budget allocations, agencies 
decrease spending proportionately more than employment. Laband (1983) 
concludes that '... a strategy of cutting output before personnel is entirely 
appropriate for the utility-maximizing agency head' (p. 311). 
The purpose of this comment is to argue that Laband's analysis is in- 
complete for three reasons. First, the differences between proposed and ac- 
tual changes in budget and employment levels are so great so as to seriously 
question the empirical results of Laband. Second, Laband's empirical anal- 
ysis is based on nominal changes in budget levels when changes in real, or 
inflation-adjusted, budget levels are more appropriate for comparisons with 
employment changes. Third, the overall change in budget and employment 
levels of agencies should be placed in the context of their relative importance 
to the total federal budget. To examine Laband's hypothesis, I use changes 
in actual budget and employment levels for the most recent available period: 
1982-83. 
2. Comparison of proposed vs. actual changes 
Table 1 displays both the proposed changes in budget and employment 
levels as used by Laband (1983) and the actual changes.' The actual changes 
are inflation-adjusted at a rate of 3.5% which is approximately the average 
for 1983. Due to proposed, but unsuccessful, elimination of the Depart- 
ments of Education and Energy previous budget forecasts were not avail- 
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83. e proposed, t suc essful, ination e art-
ents ucation Energy previous budget recasts re t ail-
able in the projections used by Laband. I have included the Department of 
Defense-Military to the table since it represented 25% of the total budget 
in 1983. Due to data problems I have excluded the International Commu- 
nication Agency and the Panama Canal Commission from the table. None- 
theless, the agencies in my sample represent 98% of budget outlays in FY 
1983.2 
A comparison of the signs on the proposed vs. actual budget figures show 
that they differ in 8 out of 19 cases. For the case of employment changes 
they differ in 5 of 19 cases. Based on partial correlation coefficients, there 
is no systematic relation between proposed and actual budgetary changes. 
Clearly, budget projections are not a reliable guide to actual decisions in this 
case. This result is not unexpected and is a consequence of many possible 
Table 1. Budget and employment figures: % A 1982-83* 
Budget Employment 
Agency Proposed Actual Proposed Actual 
Agriculture - 18.2% 23.60% -5.1% -1.86% 
Commerce - 16.9 - 9.74 - 11.2 0.86 
Defense: 
Civil - 14.3 -4.92 -5.0 -0.93 
Military 8.20 0.69 
Education -0.25 -4.95 
Energy 6.30 - 5.22 
HHS -4.4 5.28 -4.2 0.12 
HUD - 94.5 1.97 -3.4 - 5.68 
Interior 6.1 10.36 - 4.0 0.32 
Justice 2.8 5.75 - 1.1 3.36 
Labor - 7.6 19.90 -3.1 - 1.13 
State 5.4 -0.06 1.3 1.02 
Transportation - 30.2 - 0.23 3.0 2.34 
Treasury 13.6 9.97 0.7 2.31 
EPA -3.1 - 18.30 - 13.9 - 4.95 
NASA 11.3 6.61 -2.2 -0.82 
VA 3.6 -0.002 0.4 0.71 
GSA 10.5 - 46.8 - 4.0 - 5.89 
NRC 3.0 12.5 0.0 - 1.87 
OPM 6.5 2.8 -7.8 -6.59 
SBA - 33.6 - 26.8 -6.7 - 2.51 
TVA 3.3 - 48.2 - 2.6 - 13.54 
Mean - 8.25 - 2.28 - 3.63 - 2.01 
* Blanks appear for those agencies not included in Laband (1983). Nominal refers to 
noninflation-adjusted magnitudes while real is constant-dollar. 
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factors. These factors may include: problems with forecasting future infla- 
tion, changes in the direction of government policies which reallocate funds 
and employment between agencies, unexpected emergencies, and the pos- 
sibility that the Administration consciously prefers to underestimate future 
spending levels. 
Only 10 of the 22 agencies witnessed cuts in their real budget levels. Only 
six of these agencies witnessed falling employment levels. Even though the 
mean percentage change of both budget and employment levels for this sam- 
ple is negative, a one-tailed t-test of the null hypothesis of equality between 
these means cannot be rejected at any conventional level of significance. 
Therefore, it follows that the sample does not support Laband's hypothesis 
since the difference between the two sample means is not significant. 
3. A weighted-average approach 
In order to assess President Reagan's overall success at decreasing the size 
of the federal Leviathon, it is necessary to measure overall growth in real 
budget and employment levels. The analysis above is difficult o assess ince 
it weighs the contribution of all agencies equally. For example, it may be 
difficult o argue that the budget change of -48.2% in the case of TVA is 
important when one considers that it represents a mere 0.1%0o of the U.S. 
budget. However, the budget rise of 5.28% in the case of HHS is unques- 
tionably important since it represents approximately 34% of the U.S. 
budget. Moreover, the largest agency, in terms of budgetary level to witness 
a fall in real budget level is VA (3.05% of U.S. budget); however, its per- 
centage change is only -0.002%. 
Table 2 displays the budget and employments of each agency as a percen- 
tage of their totals for the U.S. in 1983 and each agency's change in real 
budget and employment over 1982-83. Weighted averages for budget and 
employment changes are computed which allows us to measure the relative 
contribution of each agency toward overall changes. 
A weighted average of budgetary changes may be calculated as follows. 
Bt = E bit i = 1, 2, ..., n (1) 
where Bt = total budget in period t 
bit = budget allocation of the ith agency in period t 
(Bt+l - Bt) (bit (bit+1- bit)) B, (B, ( bi t )) 
(Bt+l -Bt) (100 . sit (bit+l - bit)) (3) ( B, ) ( ( bit )) 
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Table 2. Agency contributions to the change in real budget and employment figures: 1983-83 
Budget Employment 
Agency 07o Total % A Contribution % Total % A Contribution 
to total to total 
Agriculture 5.70 23.60 1.34 5.45 - 1.86 0.101 
Commerce .24 - 9.74 -0.02 1.62 0.86 0.014 
Defense: 
Civil 0.36 -4.92 -0.02 1.54 -0.93 -0.014 
Military 25.20 8.20 2.07 48.86 0.69 0.337 
Education 1.79 -0.25 -0.004 0.27 -4.95 -0.013 
Energy 1.03 6.30 0.065 0.84 - 5.22 -0.044 
HHS 33.73 5.28 1.78 7.03 0.12 0.008 
HUD 1.88 1.97 0.037 0.68 - 5.68 - 0.039 
Interior 0.55 10.36 0.057 3.64 0.32 0.012 
Justice 3.48 5.75 0.200 2.76 3.36 0.093 
Labor 4.70 19.9 0.94 0.94 - 1.13 -0.011 
State 0.28 -0.06 -0.0002 1.18 1.02 0.012 
Transportation 2.53 - 0.23 - 0.006 3.06 2.34 0.072 
Treasury 14.37 1.97 0.28 5.88 2.31 0.136 
EPA 5.29 - 18.30 -0.10 0.54 - 4.95 -0.027 
NASA 0.82 6.61 0.05 1.10 -0.82 -0.009 
VA 3.05 -0.002 - 0.0001 10.76 0.71 0.076 
GSA 0.02 -48.80 -0.01 1.41 -5.89 -0.083 
NRC 0.06 12.50 0.008 0.17 - 1.87 -0.003 
OPM 2.62 2.80 0.073 0.28 - 6.59 - 0.018 
SBA 0.06 - 26.80 -0.016 0.21 - 2.51 -0.005 
TVA 0.10 -48.20 -0.049 1.77 - 13.54 -0.240 
Sum* 1.00 6.683 1.00 0.153 
* May not be exact due to rounding error. 
where Esi = = 1 B, 
The LHS of (3) is the annual percent change in t' e total budget between two 
arbitrarily chosen years while each term on the RHS is each agency's con- 
tribution to that change. Therefore (3) is a weighted average and is a product 
of each agency's importance, or weight (sit), in terms of the total budget and 
its relative change (bit+- bit) over the period. A similar computation is S bit ) 
made for employment changes. 
The relative contributions of each agency toward total budgetary and 
employment changes are displayed in columns (3) and (6) of Table 2. Sum- 
ming each contribution yields the overall change in real budget and employ- 
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ment of the U.S. government. The overall changes in real budget and em- 
ployment levels are 6.68% and 0.15%, respectively. One cannot test the 
validity of Labad's hypothesis since his hypothesis rests on the assumption 
that the U.S. government is undergoing a falling budget. As can be derived 
from Table 2, the 10 agencies which witnessed a real budget cut only ac- 
counted for 6% of the total U.S. budget in 1983. 
4. Conclusion 
After substituting actual and real changes for proposed and nominal 
changes in budgetary and employment levels, it is clear that the size and 
scope of the federal Leviathon had not been reduced over 1982-83. It is also 
clear that the agencies which witnessed real budget cuts over this period were 
of minor importance in terms of the total U.S. budget. Future research on 
why only small agencies receive real budget cuts will provide us with a better 
understanding of the budgetary process. 
There exists a strong distinction to be made between intended (proposed) 
and actual changes in government activity over time. On the one hand, re- 
search in the public choice area must recognize this distinction before de- 
riving public policy implications from empirical data. On the other hand, 
research on how these differences between proposed and actual changes 
come about and their effect on voting patterns remains a useful issue in the 
public choice literature. 
NOTES 
1. Actual budget figures for FY'82 are obtained from Budget of the United States Government 
- Fiscal Year 1982 and for FY'83 from Final Monthly Treasury Statement of the Receipts 
and Outlays of the United States Government (September 30, 1983). Employment figures 
for FY'82 and FY'83 are from Budget of the United States Government - Fiscal Years 1984 
and 1985. 
2. This is net of undistributed offsetting receipts. 
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